Libel, slander and why Facebook can’t be held accountable for outrageous statements posted by users

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Attorney David BetrasIn his most recent blog post/Mahoning Matters column, BKH Managing Partner David Betras defines defamation, libel, and slander and explains why it is virtually impossible for public figures to win defamation suits and the legal shield that protects Facebook and other social media sites from being helped accountable for statements posted by users…

As I have noted in previous columns, the rights enumerated in the U.S. Constitution are not absolute.

For example, the Supreme Court ruled in 1919 that yelling “fire” in a crowded theater is not protected speech under the First Amendment. Not surprisingly, this one exception has given rise to many questions and hundreds of cases regarding what type of expression is shielded by the Bill of Rights. For example, can a person in that hypothetical crowded theater stand up and accuse another of a crime or pass out a leaflet that impugns someone else’s character?

As is often — and often maddeningly — the case with issues involving the Constitution, the answer is, “It depends.”

In this instance, it depends on the laws governing defamation which is defined as a false statement presented as a fact that injures or damages a third party’s reputation. There are two types of defamation: slander, an untrue statement made orally; and libel, an untrue statement made in writing. And, since the dawn of the computer age and the internet, that includes email and social media posts.

While defamation is not considered a crime at the federal level or in Ohio, both libel and slander are civil torts which means victims can sue for damages. To win in court a plaintiff must prove:

1.) The statement was reported as fact to another person;
2.) The statement was false;
3.) The plaintiff suffered damages;
4.) The person making the statement was negligent.

Seems pretty straightforward, except we are talking about the law so nothing could be further from the truth. And speaking of the truth, it is an absolute defense to defamation because if what is said or written is true, it cannot be false, and therefore, it can be neither libelous nor slanderous no matter how much damage it may cause.

Here is another fun fact: Public figures have virtually no chance of winning defamation suits thanks to New York Times v. Sullivan, a unanimous 1964 Supreme Court ruling that established the “absent malice” standard. Under this legal principle, the target of a defamatory statement must prove the person or entity that wrote or uttered it did so with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the fact that it was untrue.

Who qualifies as a public figure? Politicians, celebrities, business, labor, and community leaders, and, well, me. This means Mahoning Matters can publish just about anything they want to about me and there is not much I can do about it.

Finally, consider this scenario: two neighbors who are not public figures have a contentious relationship. Neighbor A posts on Facebook that Neighbor B beats his wife and kids and kicks his dog. The statement is false, but people believe it and ostracize Neighbor B, he is fired from his job and suffers other torments.

Neighbor B can sue Neighbor A, but can he sue Facebook for providing a platform for the lies?

No, because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) holds that Facebook and other computer service providers are not considered publishers of content posted by users and are not responsible for it.

So while Neighbor B may be able to wring a few bucks out of Neighbor B, he will not be getting a check drawn on Mark Zuckerberg’s multi-billion dollar account

Complex deliberative process, legal doctrines drive Supreme Court rulings in controversial cases

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Attorney David BetrasThis week the U.S. Supreme Court handed down decisions in two closely watched controversial cases: June Medical Services LLC. et al. V. Russo and Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Along with being among the most highly anticipated rulings of the term, the opinions in the cases provided valuable insight into both the intricacies of the Court’s deliberative process and two legal precedents, stare decisis and severability, that played a critical role in the outcome and future impact of both cases.

Because the justices discuss and vote on cases in secret, most people have a simplistic view of their decision-making process which, in reality, is extremely complex. The nine members of the Court don’t sit around a table, consider the arguments and issue a ruling when five or more members side with the plaintiffs or the defendants. Discussions go on for months. Memos fly back and forth. Clerks argue with their justices. Positions change. Votes change until a solid majority in favor of an outcome emerges. This is an important point: justices only have to agree on how they are ruling, not on why. The same holds true for dissents.

The decision in June Medical v. Russo illustrates this point of law. The five justices who held that Louisiana’s law requiring doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at local hospitals is unconstitutional did so for different reasons. The Court’s four liberals, led by Justice Steven Bryer based their ruling on the fact that Louisiana’s law, like a nearly identical Texas statute struck down in 2016, put an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.

Chief Justice John Roberts, the fifth vote in the case, based his concurrence on the doctrine of “stare decisis” which means “to stand by things decided.” This doctrine obligates courts, including the Supreme Court, to follow historical cases when making a ruling on a similar matter. Ironically, Roberts had voted to uphold the Texas law in 2016, but his respect for precedent proved more compelling than his opposition to abortion.

Seila Law v. CFPB is also interesting and instructive. After being cited by the CFPB for ripping off thousands of homeowners in a mortgage scam, Seila Law filed suit against the agency alleging that its governance structure was unconstitutional and the Bureau should, therefore, be abolished. Not surprisingly, banks and big business interests who have sought to destroy the CFPB since it was created, filed briefs supporting Seila’s position.

The Court’s five conservative justices, including Roberts, agreed with the plaintiffs but only in part due to the doctrine of severability which states that if a provision of a piece of legislation is found to be illegal the remainder of the law may remain in effect. In this case, the majority rejected the agency’s governance structure but said it could continue to operate. This means that although Seila won the battle on its primary contention, it lost the war against the CFPB because the ruling protects the agency from future constitutional challenges–an outcome that clearly illustrates the way in which the doctrine of unintended consequences can really be a punch in the gut.